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Abstract: To reduce the impact of hidden corruption of the state-owned enterprise executives, first, this paper uses the difference-in-difference (DD) analysis method to 
build the DD model in the context of national audit. Second, the study analyzes the impact of the operating performance of the state-owned enterprises on the enterprise 
value. Third, it discusses the impact of the executive power of the state-owned enterprises on the hidden corruption, and uses blockchain technology with decentralization 
and high transparency, and information not be tampered with to analyze the degree of information transparency in state-owned enterprises, thereby enhancing the existing 
audit mode and improving the audit efficiency, and further predicting the trend of hidden corruption for finding the characteristics of corruption as early as possible, and timely 
governing the corruption behaviors. The research results show that the greater the power of state-owned enterprise executives is, the lower the transparency of information 
is, the less sound the supervision mechanism is, and the easier the hidden corruption of state-owned enterprise executives will breed. Only by using blockchain technology 
to enhance the audit mode, ensure data integrity, improve audit efficiency, and decrease audit risk, can the corruption of the executives of state-owned enterprises be 
effectively curbed. 
 





National audit is an important part of national 
governance, a kind of professional supervision in 
administrative supervision, and an indispensable part of 
financial administration. It monitors the operation track of 
economic activities from different aspects and links by 
reviewing, verifying, and evaluating the financial revenues 
and expenditures that comprehensively reflect economic 
activities. Moreover, it plays a comprehensive role in 
macro-control, which cannot be replaced by economic 
supervision methods. Meanwhile, several micro audits can 
be used to directly supervise the micro subjects to carry out 
economic activities in accordance with the law, thereby 
promoting the implementation of macro-control measures 
at the micro level and the improvement of micro economic 
benefits. Moreover, through the comprehensive analysis of 
a wide range of micro audit activities, it can reflect the 
situation to the decision-making part and put forward 
corresponding suggestions, thus promoting the 
improvement of macro-control and indirectly improving 
the macroeconomic benefits [1]. 
The corruption of senior executives can be divided into 
two forms: explicit corruption and hidden corruption. 
Explicit corruption is a direct violation of the relevant laws 
and regulations of the country, which is easy to be found, 
and once found, it is easy to be punished by the law. Hidden 
corruption is that executives use their power to seek 
personal benefits, which is not easy to be found and has a 
high degree of control. Hence, as the reform of state-owned 
enterprises is continuously accelerated, its system and 
mechanism, accounting treatment, business process and 
other aspects have changed greatly, which makes explicit 
corruption more common in state-owned enterprises [2]. 
The difference-in-difference (DD) method is widely 
used in the evaluation of policy effect, and because its 
calculation model is simple and easy to use and the 
regression estimation method is mature, it has been 
showing a rapid development trend in recent years. 
Blockchain technology is a subversive innovation of 
computing mode after mainframe, personal computer, and 
internet. At present, most of them are applied to the 
financial and credit systems to ensure the safety of funds 
and prevent others from tampering with relevant 
information [3]. 
Therefore, considering the advantages of DD method 
and blockchain technology, in the context of national audit, 
this paper uses DD analysis method to analyze the impact 
of state-owned enterprises' operating performance on 
enterprise value. Moreover, the blockchain technology is 
utilized to analyze the transparency of financial data and 
information in state-owned enterprises, thereby improving 
the existing audit mode, enhancing the audit efficiency, and 
providing basis for the governance of hidden corruption of 
state-owned enterprises. 
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
As the economy develops, audit has become an 
important work to ensure the healthy development of all 
walks of life. In some state-owned enterprises, the 
corruption of executives has been criticized, and its 
consequences have seriously restricted the economic and 
social development to a certain extent. 
Jeppesen (2019) refuted the previous conclusion that 
"audit can prevent personnel corruption", aiming to 
analyze how various types of audit can help to combat 
corruption [4]. Meyer‐Sahling et al. (2018) believed that in 
previous studies, the management of public officials 
themselves was mostly ignored, and corruption 
transactions would involve public officials. Therefore, 36 
pieces of relevant literature were analyzed to obtain 
favorable evidence to prove the relationship between 
compensation structure and corruption degree in public 
official's management [5]. Habib et al. (2018) pointed out 
that there was a certain relationship among political 
relationship, financial report, and audit. In the process of 
investigation and research, these empirical data confirmed 
that the quality of financial report of politically connected 
companies could provide strong evidence [6]. Paterson et 
al. (2019) analyzed the criticality of anti-corruption 
policies and practices, explored corruption issues from the 
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perspectives of transparency, audit, regulatory disclosure, 
governance, investor protection, and policies related to 
anti-corruption initiatives, and finally found that the 
adverse consequences of these behaviors would lead to 
human suffering and cost loss [7]. 
Simoyama et al. (2017) found it difficult for 
institutions in countries or regions with serious corruption 
problems to comply with relevant laws, especially in 
smaller institutions. Meantime, the national auditor could 
only select a smaller sample for audit according to the risk 
level, but not all accounts provided. There were some 
differences between audit and accounting time, so they 
proposed a non-technical framework based on blockchain 
to solve these problems. However, this research was only 
carried out in some countries, and was not extended in a 
wider range [8]. Pimentel et al. (2019) used blockchain 
technology to analyze the company's unaudited financial 
statements, but when introducing market research, it was 
found that auditors had not been able to deal with the 
complex and high-risk situation of this technology [9]. 
To sum up, after analyzing the previous literature, it is 
found that the application of blockchain in audit just begins. 
There are few pieces of literature, and few articles that 
combine DD analysis and blockchain technology to the 
corruption governance of state-owned enterprise 
executives. Hence, in the context of national audit, the DD 
analysis and blockchain technology are applied to the 
hidden corruption of state-owned enterprise executives, 
thereby minimizing the impact of hidden corruption on the 
executives of state-owned enterprises. 
 
3 METHOD 
3.1 DD Analysis 
 
DD method is a quantitative analysis method in 
econometrics, which is mainly used in the evaluation of 
policy effect in sociology. Its principle is to evaluate the 
change of observed factor y in the two cases of policy 
occurrence and non-occurrence based on a counterfactual 
framework. If an exogenous policy shock divides the 
sample into two groups: Treat group with policy 
intervention and Control group without policy intervention. 
Before the policy shock, there is no significant difference 
in y between the Treat group and the Control group. Then, 
the change of y in the Control group before and after the 
policy shock can be regarded as the situation of the Treat 
group without policy shock (counterfactual result). By 
comparing the change of y (D1) in the Treat group and y 
(D2) in the Control group, the actual effect of policy shock 
(DD = D1 − D2) is obtained [10, 11]. 
The model is shown in Eq. (1): 
 
it 0 1 2 3= + it it it t itY T A T A                       (1) 
 
where Ti is the policy dummy variable, Ai is the time 
dummy variable, Ti × At is the interaction term of the two, 
and β3 is the DD estimator. The changes of the two groups 
are shown in Eq. (2) and Eq. (3): 
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Therefore, the actual effect of policy shock is shown in 
Eq. (4): 
 
 2 3 2 31 2DD D D                         (4) 
 
Therefore, Tab. 1 is obtained: 
 
Table 1 DD analysis 
 Before the implementation of the policy After the implementation of the policy Difference 
Treat group 0 1+   0 1 2 3+ + +     2 3+   
Control group 0  0 3+   2  




Blockchain is a distributed database system, which can 
also be understood as a distributed ledger technology (DLT) 
maintained by multiple nodes, which is not easy to tamper 
with, difficult to forge, and traceable. Blockchain records 
all information of transactions. Once the data enters the 
blockchain, even internal staff cannot make any changes in 
the blockchain. This unchangeable feature does not come 
from the use of certain operations, but from the blockchain 
system and mechanism itself. This makes the blockchain 
technology simpler and more effective than other security 
technologies. Where fairness and honesty are needed, 
blockchain technology can be used [12, 13]. 
The blockchain divides the data into different blocks. 
Each block is linked to the previous block through specific 
information, and presents a complete set of data. The block 
header of each block contains a previous block hash value, 
that is, the value obtained from the hash function 
calculation of the block header of the previous block; each 
block will be linked by such hash value and the previous 
block ring to form a chain. The transaction information of 
the blockchain is randomly hashed into a hash binary tree 
called Merkle tree, whose root is included in the random 
hash value of the block. 
In terms of technology, the core features of blockchain 
include the following three aspects: 
First, block chain structure: each block has a time 
stamp, and each block contains the hash encryption 
information of the previous block to verify each transaction. 
Second, multiple independent copy storage: each node 
of the blockchain system stores the same information. 
Third, byzantine fault tolerance: tolerating less than 
1/3 nodes of malicious cheating or hacker attacks, the 
system can still work normally. 
The core working mechanism of blockchain 
technology includes timestamp mechanism, consensus 
mechanism, privacy protection mechanism, and smart 
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contract mechanism, which can make the transaction more 
efficient and less-cost, and solve the problem of trust risk 




Figure 1 Infrastructure of blockchain technology 
 
The timestamp mechanism generates a random hash 
value by real-time random hash operation on a group of 
data stored in blocks, and adds a time mark to it. Each 
timestamp incorporates its previous time stamp into its 
random hash value, and each subsequent time stamp 
enhances the previous time stamp. As a result, a complete 
traceability mechanism is formed to ensure that the data 
can be identified and tracked. Consensus mechanism 
mainly aims at improving the efficiency of system 
consensus with decentralized decision-making power, 
which can ensure the real-time, authenticity, security, and 
reliability of data on the blockchain [16, 17]. The Merkel 
tree mechanism is the basic component of blockchain 
technology, which divides data blocks into smaller units, 
and then hashes each small unit of data again until the total 
number of remaining hashes is 1, that is, the root hash. In 
this way, it is unnecessary to download each transaction 
and each block, and only verifying the root hash can prove 
the authenticity and validity of the data chain. This not only 
simplifies the data processing and query process, but also 
greatly improves the work efficiency and reduces the work 
cost. The smart contract mechanism is the core component 
of the blockchain, which can realize the active or passive 
processing of data, acceptance, storage, and transmission 
of value, to control and manage all kinds of intelligent 




4.1 Governance of State-Owned Enterprises 
 
In the state-owned enterprises, there are many cases of 
senior executives' corruption, and the total number of cases 
is rising. Since the 18th National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China, the corruption of state-owned 
enterprises has shown a downward trend, which shows that 
the corruption storm has a certain inhibitory effect on 
corruption. The corporate governance of state-owned 
enterprises in China is the product of the transformation 
from planned economy to market economy. The state-
owned enterprises are established by the initial public-
private joint venture. Then, with the continuous 
transformation from planned economy to market economy, 
the management mode of state-owned enterprises is also 
changing from the original state-owned sole proprietorship 
to company system [20]. At present, there are still some 
problems in the governance structure of state-owned 
enterprises in China, such as the relatively high proportion 
of state-owned shares, the long principal-agent chain, and 
the phenomenon of insider control, the informal system of 
independent directors, and the unreasonable mechanism of 
selection, which makes it easy for some executives to 




Figure 2 Profit statistics of Enterprises above Designated Size 
 
In the context of China's transition economy, in order 
to ensure the dominant position of public ownership, many 
listed companies of state-owned enterprises introduce 
state-owned shares, legal person shares, and public 
circulation shares in the distribution of equity. The state-
owned shares occupy an absolute control position, and 
have certain administrative color. Therefore, based on this 
problem, it is found that the governance conflicts in the 
governance process of state-owned enterprises mainly 
focus on the interest's conflicts between the state-owned 
controlling shareholders and the small and medium-sized 
shareholders. A large proportion of senior executives have 
certain administrative level, so in the selection process, 
they still maintain the traditional method, only considering 
their political future. Consequently, they are unable to 
focus on neither the profitability of the enterprise nor the 
improvement of operating efficiency. However, the 
existing independent director system is more formal. The 
majority shareholders can still control the board of 
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directors and make it lack of independence, so it is difficult 
to play the expected independent supervision role. Hence, 
the corruption of senior executives occurs from time to 
time, especially hidden corruption [21]. According to 
statistics, in 2018, the total profits of Industrial Enterprises 
above Designated Size in China reached 6635.14 billion 
yuan, an increase of 10.3% over the previous year. Fig. 2 
shows the statistics of the total profits of various 
enterprises. 
The total profit realized by collective enterprises is the 
lowest, only 10.22 billion yuan. The total profit of state-
owned holding enterprises has reached 1858.31 billion 
yuan, and the growth rate comparison is shown in Fig. 3. 
 
 
Figure 3 Growth rate of main business income and total profit of different types 
of enterprises in 2018 
 
The business income and total profit of state-owned 
enterprises are generally high, which also shows that the 
governance of state-owned enterprises is conducive to the 
realization of their business income. 
 
4.2 Sample Selection 
 
A-share listed state-owned enterprises in the China 
Stock Market and Accounting Research database (CSMAR) 
from 2012 to 2016 are selected as the research objects. 
Before the data is studied, in order to ensure the validity of 
the data, the data will be preprocessed to eliminate the 
companies with incomplete data and the companies with 
extreme values. At last, there are 270 companies that meet 
the requirements. After that, excel is used for data 
processing and SPSS is used for analysis. 
In the measurement of enterprise benefit, return on 
assets (ROA) is used, which takes state-owned share 
proportion (SSP), the sum of the shares of the top five 
shareholders (OCR5), shareholding ratio of the largest 
shareholder (CR1), and Z as explanatory variables, 
enterprise scale (SIZE) and debt to asset ratio (LEV) as 
control variables. 
 
4.3 Model Construction 
 
Many local governments have fiscal deficits. In order 
to increase employment and ensure social equity, they need 
to rely on state-owned enterprises. Thus, the managers of 
state-owned enterprises are given diversified goals in 
addition to economic growth. Meanwhile, more behaviors 
in economic activities will be interfered or supported by 
local governments, so the rights of managers will be 
increased, and also the possibility of corruption, which also 
gives executives more opportunities to obtain more 
implicit private interests. 
National audit plays an important role in preventing 
and curbing corruption and abuse of administrative rights. 
In helping to investigate and deal with economic cases and 
corporate executives' corruption, it can improve the level 
of governance civilization and corporate governance 
efficiency. Hidden corruption is a kind of crime of 
corruption, which is hidden and hard to investigate. Due to 
the development of anti-corruption storm, most executives, 
driven by the interests of the economic people, will make 
up for its utility loss in other forms. Hidden corruption has 
become the ideal choice, and the most direct performance 
is excessive on-the-job consumption and excessive pay. 
In order to make the information more transparent, the 
DD model, which controls the individual of the company 
and the two-way fixed effect of the year, is utilized to 
analyze. First, establish a model based on the relationship 
between the proportion of state-owned shares and 
enterprise performance proposed by Chen Shuang Eq. (5): 
 
2
0 1 2 3 4+ROA SSP SSP SIZE LEV                   
(5) 
 
Second, when the first largest shareholder holds a low 
share, the ownership structure will be relatively scattered, 
and small shareholders may have speculative behavior, 
which is not conducive to the governance of state-owned 
enterprises. Therefore, considering the impact of the 
ownership structure on the company's performance, the 
relationship model between the first largest shareholder's 
shareholding ratio and the company's performance is 
established Eq. (6): 
 
2
0 1 1 2 1 3 4+ROA CR CR SIZE LEV                   (6) 
 
Third, the shareholding ratio of the top five 
shareholders can approximately replace the degree of 
equity concentration of the enterprise. Generally, the 
enterprises with relatively concentrated equity tend to be 
more consistent when considering the interests than the 
enterprises with relatively decentralized equity, and can 
make decisions beneficial to the company. Therefore, the 
relationship model between the square sum of the top five 
shareholders' shareholding ratio and corporate 
performance is established Eq. (7): 
 
0 1 5 2 3+ROA OCR SIZE LEV                 (7) 
 
Finally, by analyzing the shareholding ratio of the 
second largest shareholder and the first largest shareholder, 
it can be found that there are mutual constraints between 
them. When one party makes decisions that are not 
conducive to the development of the enterprise, the other 
party has the right to veto, thus protecting the company's 
interests. In general, the larger the proportion of the two is, 
the stronger the binding force of the second shareholder on 
Jie WANG et al.: Application of Blockchain Technology in the Governance of Executive Corruption in Context of National Audit 
1778                                                                                         Technical Gazette 27, 6(2020), 1774-1780 
the first shareholder is. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze 
the relationship between the shareholding ratio and 
enterprise performance, and establish a relationship model 
Eq. (8): 
 
0 1 2 3+ROA Z SIZE LEV                    (8) 
 
5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
According to the statistical analysis of variables, the 
descriptive statistical results of variables in Fig. 4 are 
obtained. 
Fig. 4 shows that the average ROA reaches 1.25. SSP 
selected by the sample is quite different, and the standard 
deviation is 0.16, which indicates that their discrete degree 
is not high, and only individual samples are quite different. 
The selected samples are more reasonable and acceptable. 
From other variables, there is a large gap between the 
maximum and minimum values of CR1, with an overall 
mean value of about 0.4, which shows that the largest 
shareholder holds a relatively high proportion. The 
difference between the maximum value and the minimum 
value of OCR5 is second only to CR1, which shows that 
the internal equity of the selected sample is relatively 
concentrated. The difference between the maximum value 
and the minimum value of Z value is large, and the average 
value is small, which shows that the internal equity balance 
degree of the sample is low. 
 
 
Figure 4 Descriptive statistical results of variables 
 
When regression analysis is carried out among these 
variables, it is found that the t-statistics will change with 
different significance levels. For the model of Eq. (5), the 
data in Tab. 2 are obtained at 1% significance level. 
 
Table 2 Regression results of SSP and enterprise performance model 
Variables  SSP SSP2 CR1 CR12 OCR5 Z SIZE LEV R2 Adjusted R F  
 0.0877 −0.080 - - - - 1.2796 −0.155 0.425 0.415 22.160 
 
For the model of Eq. (6), when the significance level 
is 10%, the corresponding CR1 is 0.095, while CR12 is 
−0.08; when the significance level is 1%, the SIZE is 1.330, 
LEV is 0.155, and the final F is 22.230. 
For the model of Eq. (7), when the significance level 
is 5%, OCR5 is 0.040; when the significance level is 1%, 
its SIZE is 1.130, LEV is - 0.152, R2 is 0.633, adjusted R2 
is 0.623, and F is 28.801. 
For the model of Eq. (8), when the significance level 
is 1%, Z is 0.964, SIZE is 1.390, LEV is −0.153, R2 is 0.833, 
adjusted R2 is 0.823, and F is 28.271. 
Therefore, R2, adjusted R2, and F - value statistics of 
each model are all within the acceptable range, and their 
fitness meets the requirements and passes the F - test. 
On this basis, it is known too high or too low state-
owned shares are not conducive to the improvement of the 
performance of state-owned enterprises. At the significant 
level of 10%, CR1 and its square term show that there is U-
shaped relationship between the first largest shareholder 
and corporate performance. Too high or too low first largest 
shareholder's shareholding ratio is not conducive to the 
improvement of corporate performance. In the test of the 
relationship between OCR5 and corporate performance, it 
is seen that the coefficient of equity concentration is 
positive, and P is positive, which means that equity 
concentration is positively related to corporate 
performance at the significance level of 5%. Moderate 
concentration of equity is conducive to the improvement of 
corporate performance. The coefficient of Z index is 
positive at the significance level of 1%. Equity balance is 
conducive to the improvement of enterprise performance. 
Hence, the internal audit and the turnover rate of total 
assets under the governance of state-owned enterprises are 
analyzed, and the average test results are shown in Fig. 5.  
Fig. 5 shows that the Difference value of the Treat 
group before and after the governance is 0.8070, while that 
of the Control group is 0.0296. Therefore, DD currently is 
0.7774. However, the significant level is inconsistent at this 
time. Hence, the single variable analysis of internal audit 
and total asset yield is shown in Fig. 6. 
 
 
Figure 5 Internal audit and analysis of turnover rate of total assets 
 
Fig. 6 suggests that the average value obtained is 
significant at the level of 1%. At this time, the DD value 
between the Treat group and the Control group is 0.0533. 
There is a greater change after governance than before, 
indicating that internal audit has a higher help for the 
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profitability of enterprises. 
 
 
Figure 6 Internal audit and return on total assets 
 
When applying blockchain technology to analyze the 
relevant information of state-owned enterprises, it is found 
that the technology can improve the system operation 
efficiency and minimize the cost while ensuring the 
information security. The transaction records of blockchain 
are transparent, and there will be no privacy. This 
information can also be viewed, but it cannot be modified, 
so it also provides strong evidence for government 
supervision. Meanwhile, the timestamp in blockchain 
technology is immutable, so it is not easy to tamper with, 
which is of great help to fight against counterfeiting and 
information rectification. From the perspective of trust, all 
rules in the blockchain have been implemented in the form 
of programs. The technology adopts a complete 
redundancy strategy to ensure that all the complete nodes 
have complete data. To change the existing data, it is 
necessary to modify all the data, but it seems impossible, 
which reduces the risk of fraud. 
As an important part of the governance of state-owned 
enterprises, the most important thing is to solve the security 
problem, not only prevent corruption clues from missing in 
the data flow, but also prevent data from being tampered, 
hidden, or destroyed. Second, solve the confidentiality of 
data. As invisible corruption is not easy to be detected, it is 
necessary to compare and verify the reported information 
of corruption with corruption, and more links are also 
prone to the risk of disclosure. Moreover, the use of 
information technology can better solve the corruption 
governance work and improve the existing audit mode. 
From the big data-based audit 3.0 to the currently semi-
automatic and automatic audit 4.0, the use of sensors, the 
Internet of things, and radio frequency identification for 
audit is characterized by the generation and application of 
distributed ledger represented by blockchain. Fig. 7 shows 
the information interaction mode of each audit stage: 
Among them, Fig. 7a shows the information 
interaction mode of audit 1.0 and 2.0, mainly simple 
account book and double account book, with serious 
centralization; Fig. 7b shows the big data-based audit of 
audit 3.0, with digital account book and decentralized 
mode; Fig. 7c shows the information interaction mode of 
audit 4.0, mainly distributed account book, semi-automatic 
and automatic audit process. 
As can be seen from Fig. 7, the information interaction 
mode in this stage is distributed, and the account book 
adopts distributed mode. The cost of information 
identification in this form is far lower than that in the first 
three stages, but the cost of information recording is higher 
than that in the previous three stages. Blockchain 
technology also realizes the transformation from a closed 
system to a real-time and transparent distributed system, 
ensuring the authenticity and effectiveness of business. 
 
 
Figure 7 Audit information interaction mode 
 
To sum up, when using the DD analysis method to 
analyze the state-owned enterprises, it is found that the 
proportion of state-owned shares, OCR5, the proportion of 
the first largest shareholder, and the proportion of the 
second largest shareholder and the first largest shareholder 
all need to ensure an appropriate proportion, thus avoiding 
the phenomenon of hidden corruption of senior executives 
when the proportion of state-owned shares is too large. In 
the process of governance of state-owned enterprises, it is 
supposed to focus on the hidden corruption of executives 
in addition to the ownership structure. The use of 
blockchain technology can ensure the security and 
transparency of distributed account data, thereby 
preventing the occurrence of hidden corruption of state-




The DD analysis method is used to build the model of 
state-owned enterprises' equity problems, for exploring the 
relationship between equity problems and business 
performance, and further analyzing the impact of business 
performance on enterprise value. On this basis, the 
situation of executives' implicit corruption in the 
governance of state-owned enterprises is analyzed, and the 
existing audit methods are discussed by using blockchain 
technology. It points out that the audit 4.0 stage of 
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distributed account application represented by blockchain 
technology can ensure its security and transparency and not 
being tampered with to a certain extent. However, in the 
research process, this paper does not make a specific case 
analysis of the application of blockchain technology in the 
governance process of state-owned enterprise executives' 
hidden corruption, which will be further refined in the later 
research, thereby making the governance work of 
executives' hidden corruption more intelligent and efficient. 
In the context of national audit, the combination of DD 
analysis and blockchain technology to deal with the hidden 
corruption of the executives of state-owned enterprises is 
of great significance to improve the existing audit methods, 
and to establish a new anti-corruption management system. 
Maximizing the role of big data in anti-corruption work 
and using blockchain technology also aims at preventing 
corruption as much as possible, thereby creating a healthy 
and honest enterprise. Meanwhile, it can also be used for 
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